ment with no cross-location communication. This motivates the introduction in Section V of tokens as a communication device. This is the currency-like object. To deliver a price system and hence measurable currency, Section VI weakens the planning problem, allowing unobserved cross-household exchange. Section VII then extends the environment somewhat and displays an example of optimal variations in currency relative to total indebtedness and relative to the indebtedness of nonmovers, that is, to named credits. Section VIII touches on the costs of the various record-keeping systems.
II. The Physical Environment
consider an economy with one underlying consumption good, three dates, N locations, and N2 agents (essentially N per location). At the first date, that is, at t = 0, all agents get together to decide on Paretooptimal rules, to be described in this essay. Thus there is full commitment to the arrangement, that is, perfect costless enforcement of it. At the beginning of the second date, t = 1, agents are dispersed to locations, N agents to each location. Finally, at the beginning of date t = 2, a fraction X of the population of each location stays put in its initial location assignment, and a fraction (1 -X) of the population of each location is shifted to new locations in such a way that each "shifter" encounters no agents he has known previously at date t = 1. Thus XN agents of each location stay in residence for two periods and (1 -X)N agents of each location are dispersed in some way to the other N -1 locations.1 For much of the analysis, N will be taken to be arbitrarily large; that is, the mathematics assumes N = oc. The N = X economy is envisioned as the limit of finite N economies as N x, but this limit is never taken explicitly.
After settling in the location assignment of date t = 1, every agent receives one unit of the single consumption good of the model. This good can never be transferred across locations. The consumption good may be eaten by someone at date t = 1, at the endowment location, or alternatively it may be stored at that location for consumption at that location at date t = 2. The gross return on storage is some parameter R -1, so that one unit of the consumption good ' For example, let N = 4 and let X take on values j/N,j = 1, 2, . . ., N -1. If' X = '4, let one agent remain at each location and let the three departing agents move to the other three locations, one to each of' the three nearest location neighbors to the right, moving clockwise around a circle. If' = '2/1, let two agents remain at each location and let the two departing agents move to the two nearest location neighbors to the right, one to each, and so on t'or A = ?4. Here, of course, A is such that AN is an integer, and this is assumed to be true generally. Similar integer assumptions are made throughout the text. Of' course when N = x, only fractions of' the population need be specified. stored at the end of date t = 1 yields R units of the consumption good at the beginning of date t = 2.
Whatever might be his location, each agent has preferences over units of consumption c1 and c2 in periods 1 and 2, respectively, as represented by a utility function U(ci, T) + V(c2, T). Here T is a shock to preferences, a "demand" shock, which among other things determines an agent's rate of intertemporal substitution. For simplicity, shock T can take on one of a finite number of values, that is T E {1, 2, ... . ,n}. For each T, the function U(, T) is strictly concave, is continuously differentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions U'(O, T) = x and U'(0c, T) = 0; similarly for V(, T).
It is supposed that at each location at date t = 1, a fraction (T) of agents in the population receive shock T. Of course these fractions must add to unity, that is, ET W(T) = 1. In the absence of any other information, each agent in the planning period t = 0 naturally views his own shock T as determined in a random way, that shock T will occur with probability W(T).
At the same time at date t = 1 that the distribution of shocks T is determined, date t = 2 location assignments are also determined and revealed (but not executed).2 Similarly, with fraction 1 -I of the agents of each location to be shifted at the beginning of date t = 2, each agent in the planning period views his probability of being shifted as determined in a random way. If we let 0 denote the "location" or "transaction" shock, which takes on two values (i.e., 0 = 1 for "staying" and 0 = 2 for "moving"), each agent views 0 = 1 as being drawn with probability X and 0 = 2 as being drawn with probability 1 -A. For simplicity of notation, let X(0) denote the fraction of agents who receive shock 0, so that here, for example, X(0 = 1) = A and X(0 = 2) = 1 -A.
Finally, it will be supposed initially that the distribution of the population by preference shocks T is independent of the distribution of the population by location movements 0, so that from an individual's point of view the random variables T and 0 are also independent. Economywide, the fraction of agents who receive shocks T and 0 = 2 is W(T)(l -A), and so on.
It is supposed in what follows that preference shocks T received at the beginning of date t = I are privately observed by the individual but that future location assignments 0 received at the beginning of date t = 1 are fully observed. Further, though the population fractions 2 Here and below several alternative environments will suggest themselves. Here an alternative would be for agents to see preference shocks prior to seeing location assignments. Such alternatives suggest interesting paths to pursue in subsequent efforts. The effort here is to produce a simple, albeit dramatic, example economy. w and X may be determined at random at the beginning of date t = 1 with probabilities prob(w) and prob(X), respectively, for each of a finite number of possible values of w and X, the actual draws of w and X are presumed to be public information as well.
As is evident, the environment under consideration in this paper is essentially the one considered by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , but here with a slightly more general preference specification and enlarged to accommodate distinct locations. The key idea is that the model determines the consumption paths of the individual agent types and hence determines the amount of the consumptioninvestment good that is invested at date t = 1 and claimed by the agent types at date t = 2. The latter amount is a natural measure of aggregate lending or indebtedness.
III. The Optimal Credit Arrangement with Full Cross-Location Communication
In the context of the environment described above, we may index the consumption of each agent by the individual-specific shocks T and 0, at least with the imposition of certain incentive-compatibility constraints described below, so that announcements of preference shocks coincide with actual realizations. Consumption may be indexed by economywide fractions w and X as well. Thus the number of units of consumption at date t of the "representative agent" is denoted c,Q(, 0, w, X). As is evident, then, no effort is made to distinguish agents by name or by their initial date t = 1 location assignment. Consumption at date t = 1 for an agent at one location is supposed to be the same as the consumption at date t = 1 for an agent at any other location if their shocks T and 0 coincide.3 Similarly, the issue at date t = 2 for an individual is what announced (and actual) preference shocks were at date t = 1 and whether or not an agent moved. Thus the key assumption in this section is that announced preference shocks at date t = 1 are public at date t = 2 even in a location distinct from the location in which shocks were announced. In this sense full cross-location communication is assumed, histories are common knowledge, and so formally there are no strangers.
The objective in what follows, then, is to characterize an allocation 3 Also, the assumption is that only the individual state (r, 0) and the aggregate state Here again the objective function is the expected utility of the representative agent from the point of view of date t = 0, with expectations over individual shocks T and 0 and over population fractions w and X. Constraint (2) is a resource constraint for date t = 1, applicable for all locations, where W(w, X) stands for per capita "withdrawals" of consumption from possible investment at date t = 1, conditioned on w and X. Constraint (3) is a resource constraint for date t = 2, again applicable for all locations. Constraints (2) and (3) are both written in per capita terms and hold for the N = xc economy. The class of constraints (4) is a class of incentive-compatibility constraints; it ensures that for given and fully observed location shock 0 and population fractions w and X, an individual would prefer at date t = 1 to announce the actual observed preference shock T and receive consumption stream {cI(T, 0, w, X), c2(T, 0, w, X)} rather than announce counterfactual preference shock T' and receive consumption stream 
IV. The Optimal Credit Arrangement with No Cross-Location Communication
Now suppose that preference shock announcements of an individual agent at date t = 1 are not public information at date t = 2 if that agent shifts locations between dates 1 and 2. Thus the history of a "shifter" or "mover" would be private information, and a shifter may be said to encounter relative strangers. Otherwise, the structure of the model remains unchanged. That is, agents are still presumed to commit themselves in the planning period to some social arrangement, that is, to some economywide credit arrangement, that specifies consumptions and hence transfers to agents conditioned on the economywide state (w, X), on the individual-specific but publicly observed location shocks 0, and possibly on individual announcements of the individual-specific and privately observed preference shocks T. Now, however, these latter announcements may have less content. For suppose that agents who move are to reannounce preference shocks at date t = 2 since there is no one present who knows the date t = 1 announcement. On his arrival at his new location at date t = 2, any mover has a choice in the family of consumptions {c2(T, 0 = 2, w, X)}, indexed by T, and thus it is clear that any such mover would always name the T value that achieves the highest level of consumption, inde--I Technically, program 1 can be converted to a linear program by consideration of lotteries over consumptions, not deterministic allocations. Often, however, these lotteries do not appear in solutions, and they are ignored here altogether for simplicity of exposition and computation. For a more extended discussion of lotteries and the pitfalls of proceeding without them, see Townsend (1988a 
and so it is apparent that c2(T, 0 = 2, w, X) must be some constant, independent of preference shocks T, denoted c-2(0 = 2, w, X). By the same logic, then, as we roll the dynamic program back to date t = 1, incentive-compatibility conditions (4) at 0 = 2 with c2(T, 0 -2, w, X) = c-2(0 = 2, w, X), for all T, imply that1 (T, 0 = 2, w, X) must be some constant, independent of preference shocks T, denoted c-l (0 = 2, w, X). Of course, no problem of this kind emerges for agents who do not move; with past histories fully observed by at least two agents present in each location, past histories can be made public to all agents present, as in Harris and Townsend (1981) . With the assumption of full commitment, then, intertemporal tie-ins can still be used to distinguish agents by preference shocks T in a beneficial way. That is, those who stay at a location with their cohorts can enter into more effective agreements than those who must deal in the future with relative strangers. But overall, from the point of view of the planning period, all agents are made worse off by the absence of cross-location communication. Consumption is now dependent on whether or not an agent is a mover and a mover's consumption path is independent of shocks T.
V. Tokens as a Communication Device
Now suppose that there is some object in the environment that is intrinsically useless, that can be carried about and concealed by the agents, and that otherwise is subject to strict societal control. That is, the object can be manufactured and distributed to agents only under agreed-on rules.
Such tokens in our private information, limited communication environment can be enormously beneficial. In fact, for the environment considered in this paper, one can recover the solution to the original, full communication programming problem. Consider the following scheme. At date t = 1, all agents are again to announce preference shocks T. Let those who are designated movers and who declare themselves to have a particular T value consume the date 1, c, ( . Thus higher levels of tokens are to entitle movers to higher levels of second-period consumption. In fact, at date t = 2, let movers declare one of the possible values of these privately observed token holdings, some value of m(T, W, X) for a possible value of T. As more is preferred to less, agents will never declare fewer tokens than they actually hold, and the target consumption bundles c2(T, 0 = 2, W, X) are achieved. As is apparent, then, movers face the same menu of consumption streams as in the solution to the original programming problem, so that solution can be implemented here in an incentive-compatible way.
Of course the key to achieving this result is the alteration, with the introduction of tokens, of the second-period incentive-compatibility constraints themselves. Conditions (5) are now replaced with the following. Let m(T, W, X) denote actual, beginning-of-second-period token holdings of a mover conditioned on having announced shock T at date t = 1 and conditioned on the economywide state (w, X). Also let f(m, w, X) denote the date t = 2 deposit or payment of tokens conditioned on an announcement of m units of tokens, on being a mover, and on the economywide state (w, X). so that "honest" announcements of tokens are incentive compatible. The point, of course, is that with the kind of societal control assumed in this paper, tokens are reliable records of past actions even among relative strangers. Equations (6) and (7) allow more effective indexation on unobserved first-period announcements than (5) does.
VI. Unobserved Trades and the Emergence of an Exchange Rate
Thus far tokens allow agents with different histories to be distinguished in the obvious way: those entitled to higher second-period consumptions carry a greater number of tokens. But there is no natural value for tokens per se. They serve as badges or stamps, as if a 1332 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY receipt for some past action or transfer. For three actions to be distinguished, say actions 1, 2, and 3, it is enough that the three actions entitle one to a different number of tokens, say low, medium, and high. Relative differences, such as between low-medium and medium-high, do not matter.
As tokens would seem in many circumstances to be more than a badge or stamp, in fact to have some value or price in terms of consumption goods, and as our interest here is in the number of tokens in the economy as a function of the state of the economy, something must be done to alter the model. The idea here is to weaken ex ante beneficial restrictions on trade by supposing additional private information, that strangers carrying tokens can make deals with one another on the side, unobserved and anonymously, both before and after they appear before the local distribution center of their new location.
It should be noted that, despite this modification, the full commitment postulate remains in place. Agents agree in the planning period to show up at the distribution center of their second-period location assignment and are restricted there to making announcements in some prespecified message space and to engaging in prespecified trades as a function of messages. This they still do. But now consumption cannot take place at the distribution center of the second period. Rather, movers are assigned, both before and after they appear at the distribution center, to a foggy location where they can make unobserved deals with one another. In fact, just prior to their arrival at the center of their new location, movers can commit in the foggy location to trades in consumption and tokens, and again, as with the t = 0 initial agreement, these side exchanges are honored. In short, what is weakened in the new environment is the amount of public information, not the amount of commitment.
It is important also not to weaken or, better put, to strengthen the communication technology at the same time. If agents were to carry tokens with their names on them and agents were identified by name at exchange windows of the second location, then this side exchange could be precluded. But to explore the communication and recordkeeping idea of the paper, we must somehow take seriously that crosslocation communication can be limited a priori, either exogenously, as here, with uniform tokens or endogenously, as in Section VIII, where it is costly to make distinctions.
To motivate the formal description of the unobserved side exchanges that now are possible, it is useful to consider first two proposed second-period allocation rules, functions that map announced (and actual) token holdings into second-period consumption. The first proposed allocation rule appears in figure 1. Under it, house- 
this redistribution of tokens is feasible. Further, multiplying (10) by the slope s of the linear schedule connecting the endpoints in figure 2 yields agents who pretend to be type M3 surrendering (c3 -j2) units of consumption and agents who pretend to be type ml acquiring (c2 -Ci) units of consumption as a feasible redistribution of the consumption good. Thus each pretender ends up with c2. Of course, C2 > C2, and so each of the N agents is made better off by this scheme. Only linear schedules escape the kind of manipulations described in figures 1 and 2. The slope of any linear schedule is the obvious price of tokens in terms of the consumption good, the inverse of the nominal price of consumption. The intercept of the linear schedule is interpreted as a guaranteed minimal consumption.
To proceed more formally, it is supposed first that some arbitrary schedule c2(m, 0 = 2, w, X) is proposed for movers announcing m given state (w, X). Second, following Townsend (1978 Townsend ( , 1983 ), a game that allows side payments yet preserves anonymity among movers is defined. Third, a symmetric outcome of the game is described, inducing some de facto consumption schedule c2(m, 0 = 2, a, X). In particular, it is argued that the de facto schedule must be linear, for other-wise it could not be an equilibrium outcome, as already suggested above. Fourth, the obvious conclusion is that the initial schedule c2(m, 0 = 2, w, K) may as well have been taken to be linear. The formal argument is somewhat tedious and is reserved for the Appendix. Two further modifications to the model will thus be considered. The second, to be considered in the next section, allows the issue of tokens to be costly. Here, in this section, tokens are still virtually costless, but one allows some initial conditions to be predetermined and, below, constant across economies (to allow across comparisons relative to realized shocks). This is accomplished formally as follows.
VII. Optimal Variability in
Suppose that in each location at the first date there are two rounds of departures of movers, with nonmovers in the population as the residual. The fraction of first-round movers is A1, and a fraction wI (7) of these movers experience preference shock 7. For the purpose of an example, let A, and I (r) be deterministic, so that there is no uncertainty about these fractions, and notation for these fractions in consumptions can be suppressed. Consumption by first-round movers takes place in the first period prior to departure. After first-round movers have left, the fraction of second-round movers is determined. The fraction of second-round movers is K2, and a fraction w2(T) of these movers experience preference shock 7. The fractions \2 and w2(T) are drawn randomly with probabilities prob(K2, w2), and their realizations are known to everyone. However, as noted, consumptions of firstround movers are already determined, and so these cannot be indexed by the state (X2, W2) After second-round movers have departed, a fraction 3j = 1 -XI -X2 of agents in the population are in the residual category, and a fraction W3(T) of these nonmovers experience preference shock 7. For the purpose of an example, let (3(7) be deterministic. Of course, K3 is determined as a residual given K2. Thus notation for fractions Kj and wA is suppressed from consumptions.
Thus let cl (7, 0 = 1) denote consumption at date 1 for first-round movers, 0 = 1, as a function of announced (and actual) preference shocks 7, and let them receive tokens in the amount m(T, 0 = 1). As will be noted, token levels m(T, 0 = 1) must be somewhat arbitrary. Let cI (T, 0 = 2, w2, K2) and m(T, 0 = 2, w2, K2) denote first-period consumption and token amounts to second-round movers, 0 = 2, as functions of announced (and actual) preference shocks 7 and state (W2, K2). As will be noted, token amounts m(T, 0 = 2, W2, K2) will be determinate given the m(T, 0 = 1) levels. Let cl (7, 0 = 3, w2, K2) denote first-period consumption for nonmovers. Let P(w2, K2) denote the price of tokens in terms of consumption at date 2, the inverse of the nominal price level, and let c-(W2, K2) denote the intercept of the linear consumption-token schedule. Finally, let C2(T, 0, w2, K2) denote second-period consumption for 0 = 1, 2, 3 agents as a function of preference shocks 7 and state (w2, K2). Note that these consumptions are endogenous for movers, 0 = 1, 2 agents, in the sense that they are determined by P (W2, K2), -(W2, K2) , and the specification of tokens. One might take as a measure of real named debt in this economy the amount of second-period consumption claimed by nonmovers, namely X3C2(T = .5, 0 = 3, w, X) since this is achieved by cohortspecific accounts with the identity of first-period agents intact. This measure of debt also moves with the state. So also does total secondperiod consumption, as a measure of total indebtedness. Finally, the ratio of real tokens to total indebtedness also moves with the state (and this is true as well when intercepts are added to the purchasing power of tokens), as does the ratio of real tokens to named debts.7
VIII. On the Costs of Tokens and Named Credit Systems
Part, but not all, of the analysis thus far hinges on some implicit assumptions about the costs of various technologies that should now be brought out more fully. First, throughout the analysis, the cost of setting up, maintaining, and using any within-location accounting system is presumed to be zero. Second, from the analysis of Section IV onward, the cost of direct communication across locations is presumed to be infinity (whereas in Sec. III it is zero). Third, in order to remove indeterminacy as between the use of tokens and withinlocation accounts, the cost of tokens is nonzero but essentially negligible. This last assumption requires some elaboration. A problem that emerges if tokens are completely costless is that tokens can be used by nonmovers. That is, within-location accounts would not be needed, and one could get by with just one asset. In this case, measures of tokens would be pinned down and would still move around, at least on the assumption that initial movers must carry some tokens with them. But one could not compare tokens to credit in such a model.
The obvious remedy is to make the issue of tokens costly. Thus suppose that there is some minimal size token, say one unit, and each unit issued at date 1 after the revelation of shocks costs +, units of the consumption-investment good at date 1. With this cost it is clear that nonmovers should always use within-location accounts. Movers, on the other hand, do not have fruitful access to within-location accounts and should use either a minimal size configuration of tokens or nothing. The implicit assumption of the analysis is that for every draw of state (W2, X2), tokens dominate in this choice since they allow consumptions to be indexed by preference shocks 7, even though their issue is costly. This can be delivered formally for sufficiently low cost + by a continuity argument.
Two further points should be noted in passing. First, the determination of optimal token issue for any positive finite cost q would be nontrivial. With the minimal size or indivisibility assumption on tokens, integer amounts of them must be assigned to support planned consumption levels. Still, the token-consumption points must all lie on a linear schedule (from the earlier analysis). A sufficient, but not necessary, condition for this is that planned consumptions be rational numbers, so that one can find among them a least common denominator. But one can get arbitrarily close to any arbitrary consumption array if one is willing (and able) to issue the requisite number of tokens. Second, with costly token issue, the nominal issue of tokens would be pinned down for all economywide states even if schedules are determined ex post. The complaint at the beginning of Section VII motivating two rounds of movers is now moot. But examples seem difficult to compute. Again, the solution described earlier is an example in the limit for virtually negligible costs.
Another possibility to ensure the use of both within-location accounts and tokens would be to make tokens work less well when they are used. In particular, one could increase the number of underlying commodities and add second-period shocks to second-period prefer-tokens m on hand are still the only relevant state variable, and so announcements can be restricted to it.
The game to be played by movers against schedule c2[T, 0 = 2, X, W, F] given beginning-of-second-period conditions, M, the finite set of possible values for m under date 1 handouts m (, w, X), and h(m) the actual fraction of movers holding balances m, m E M, is described as follows. First, moving agents arriving at a particular location are assigned names in an anonymous fashion, taking numbers one at a time and unobserved by others. The set of names can be taken to be the set of positive integers, and we may refer to a generic agent named i, i = 1, 2 .... Second, each of these agents announces a strategy under which he is willing to be an anonymous go-between, naming a local location for trades but not revealing his identity. More specifically, let A' (m, +) denote the number of pieces of paper (hence the m subscript) proposer i is willing to give out to anyone in the set of movers if m is named (hence the first argument in parentheses) and a plus sign (for handout) is indicated (hence the second argument in parentheses), let A' (m, -) denote the number of pieces of paper required to be handed in to proposer i if m is named and a minus sign is indicated, and let A (m, +) and Af(m, -) denote handouts and take-ins of the consumption good if m is named and a plus or minus is indicated, respectively. Here it is understood that if an agent goes to proposer i and names m and a plus for paper, he must choose a minus for consumption and vice versa. Also, he cannot claim both a plus and a minus for paper at the same m. Of course, an agent could choose to do nothing with a particular proposer i, effectively setting A(, ) and A(-, ) to zero, and the proposer can specify that some of these components be zero as well. 
